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BOOK REVIEW 

HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE. By Paul J. Liacos. Bos­
ton, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Co. 1981. 
Reviewed by Michael G. West· 

Joseph H. Reinhardt·· 

In 1940 the late W. Barton Leach, Story Professor of Law at 
Harvard University, published the first edition of the Massachusetts 
Handbook ofEvidence. Publication of the second and third editions 
occurred in 1948 and 1956, respectively. Justice Liacos collaborated 
with Professor Leach on the fourth edition, published in 1967. After 
publication of the fourth edition, the meticulous scholarship of Pro­
fessor Leach and Justice Liacos garnered for the book the acclama­
tion of "'the Bible' on evidence in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts." I In 1981, a fifth edition, written by Justice Liacos, 
was published and is the subject of this review. 
The format of the fifth edition parallels that of the fourth edi­
tion. The book is divided into twenty topics, ranging from "Authen­
tication" to "Search and Seizure."2 In this edition, however, Justice 
Liacos has deleted the fourth edition topic, "Recent Develop­
ments,"3 and has added an entirely new topic entitled "Identification 
Evidence."4 This change was a result of significant developments in 
the law of evidence in the fourteen years since the publication of the 
fourth edition.5 
* Partner, Kamberg, Berman, Gold & West, P.C., Springfield, Massachusetts; 
Member of the New York and Massachusetts Bars. B.S., Ithaca College, 1966; J.D., Uni­
versity of New York at Buffalo, 1969. 
** Associate, Hendel, Collins & Stocks, P.e., Springfield, Massachuseus; Mem­
ber, Massachusetts Bar. A.B., Haverford College, 1967; M.A" Chapman College, 1972; 
J.D., Western New England College School of Law, 1982. 
1. P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETIS EVIDENCE xxi (5th ed. 1981). 
2. P. LlAcos, supra note I, at ix-xix. 
3. W. LEACH & P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETIS EVIDENCE, 1-13 (4th 
ed. 1967). 
4. P. LIACOS, supra note I, at 245-59. 
5. Id. at xxi·xxii. 
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Each subject is presented in outline format and the analytical 
approach taken toward individual topics is determined by the spe­
cific nature of the topic. Analysis of topics not evoking constitu­
tional issues6 includes a statement of the appropriate evidentiary rule 
within the commonwealth and a discussion of the history and recent 
developments associated with the rule. Citalions to cases with his­
torical value are provided, as are citations to cases as of December 
31, 1980. A particularly helpful addition to this edition is citation to 
and discussion of the proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence 
which are currently under consideration by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court and which parallel the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.7 
The material on judicial notice8 represents an excellent example 
of Justice Liacos' analysis of a nonconstitutional topic and one citing 
relevant portions of the proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. 
Justice Liacos notes that under current Massachusetts practice, infor­
mation not introduced into evidence that may influence the outcome 
of a case is judicially noticeable when it is already part of a court's 
knowledge or is derived from an almanac, court report, or statutory 
compilation not in evidence. Such information may be judicially no­
ticed only when it is indisputably true, a matter of common knowl­
edge within the community, or a matter of generalized knowledge 
readily ascertainable from authoritative sources.9 Professor Kenneth 
Culp Davis, a leading expert in the field of administrative law, has 
termed such information "adjudicative facts."lo Adjudicative facts 
are distinguished from legislative, legal, and political facts, a trio 
whose elements are not subject to the requirement of judicial notice 
in order to be considered in the court's decision. I I Rule 201 of the 
proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence limits the requirement 
for judicial notice to adjudicative facts. The proposed rule, there­
fore, does not affect the current power and practice of the courts to 
6. See, e.g., P. LIACOS, supra note I, at 1-61, 133-63 (topics on Judicial Admissions 
and Judicial Notice, Burden of Proof and Presumptions, and Impeachment). 
7. Justice Liacos includes specific provisions of the proposed Rules in relevant sec­
tions of the book. For a complete text of the proposed Rules, see 19 K. HUGHES, MASSA­
CHUSElTS PRACTICE EVIDENCE 333-413 (West Supp. 1981). The Rules were submitted 
to the Supreme Judicial Court by the Advisory Committee in July, 1980. The court has 
not yet approved the Rules. Id. at 325. 
8. LIACOS, supra note I at 17-20. 
9. Id. at 18-19. 
10. Davis, An Approach 10 Problems ofEvidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364,402 (1942). 
II. Id. at 402-07. 
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consider matters which are legislative, political, or legal in nature 
without taking judicial notice of them. 12 
Analysis of topics evoking constitutional issues l3 begins with a 
short synopsis of the status of federal constitutional law as of March 
1, 1981. Subsequent discussion within these topics involves a state­
ment of the Massachusetts rule of evidence and how the rule is inter­
twined with the federal constitutional scheme. Here again, Justice 
Liacos includes citations to both significant historical and recent 
cases. 
The discussion of search and seizure l4 is a representative exam­
ple of Justice Liacos' analysis of a topic that provokes constitutional 
issues. He begins with an historical discussion of the exclusionary 
rule, noting that illegally obtained evidence long was held admissible 
under both the Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions. Massa­
chusetts and federal practice diverged, however, when the Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the view that the sole 
remedy of the aggrieved party was a civil or criminal action against 
the offending law enforcement officer. IS This view was contrary to 
that of the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 16 where the 
Court adopted an exclusionary rule for evidence illegally obtained 
by federal officers. The Supreme Court finally applied the exclu­
sionary rule to state practice with its 1961 decision in Mapp v. 
Ohio. 17 Historical discussion of the exclusionary rule concludes with 
the observation that, in light of Justice Burger's recent criticism of 
the rule, the Court has adhered to the rule but has refused to extend 
its reach. 18 Substantive discussion of the rule ranges from what con­
stitutes a "search" to the requirements of standing for initiation of a 
motion to suppress. Until recently a defendant could establish 
standing to pursue a motion to suppress in anyone of three ways: 
(1) Demonstration of a proprietary or possessory interest in the 
premises searched or object seized; (2) a showing of the defendant's 
legitimate presence on the premises searched; or (3) automatic stand­
ing derived from the existence of an element of possession in the 
12. P. LIACOS, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
13. See, e.g., id. at 217-59, 295-320 (topics on Search and Seizure, Identification 
Evidence, and Hearsay-Confessions). 
14. Id. at 217-44. 
15. Id. at 218; Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356,361-62, 138 N.E. 11, 13 
(1923). 
16. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
17. 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). 
18. P. LIACOS, supra note 1, at 219-20. 
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crime charged. 19 Of particular interest is the point that, despite the 
Supreme Court's recent revision of the doctrine of establishment of 
standing to a single requirement of demonstration of violation of 
reasonable expectation of privacy,20 the Massachusetts Supreme Ju­
dicial Court has not considered whether the former standing doc­
trine will continue to have some utility for treatment of claims based 
on state law.21 This potential divergence is important to attorneys 
who would seek to advance a motion to suppress but are unable to 
do so under the fourth amendment because of an absence of a viola­
tion of the expectation of privacy, required under the federal doc­
trine of standing. 
Throughout the analysis of each topic, Justice Liacos attempts 
to adhere to the three purposes underlying both this edition and the 
fourth edition: To provide quick reference aid to members of the 
bench and bar in the trial of cases; a means of preparation for Mas­
sachusetts bar examinations; and use as a textbook in law school evi­
dence courses.22 
The outline format of the analysis within each topic is support­
ive of the book's intended function as a quick reference aid. The 
inclusion of tables of cited cases,23 statutes,24 and rules of court,25 
and an extensive topical index26 further enhances this function. 
The characteristics adding to the book's value as a quick refer­
ence aid also facilitate its proposed use as an aid in the preparation 
for Massachusetts bar examinations. These same characteristics, 
however, limit the book's use as a primary text in law school evi­
dence courses. The book is more akin to a hornbook or treatise 
which presents statements of the appropriate principles oflaw, rather 
than a casebook requiring the student to inductively reason those 
principles from analysis of a series of successively related cases. The 
book, however, will function as an excellent supplementary reading 
assignment to be made by those law professors who wish to provide 
students with discussion of Massachusetts evidence and a compari­
son of Federal and Massachusetts Proposed Rules. The book will 
19. Id. at 241. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 242-43. 
22. I d. at xxiii. 
23. Id. at 459-588. 
24. Id. at 489-92. 
25. Id. at 493-500. 
26. Id. at 501-48. 
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provide professor and student with a starting point for discussion of 
the strengths and weaknesses of state and federal rules. 
Although adherence to the book's purposes results in concise 
but brief topic analyses, the book remains valuable to those search­
ing for an extensive discussion of evidentiary principles. This is pri­
marily due to the cross-referencing of topics and the citations to such 
noted authorities on evidence as Morgan,27 McCormick,28 and 
Wigmore.29 
The materials on judicial notice and burden of proof provide 
excellent examples of references to noted authorities. The section on 
judicial notice refers the reader first to the late Dean Morgan's 1944 
article in the Harvard Law Review.3o Morgan's article lays the foun­
dation for the modem concept of judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts, that is, judicial notice of those propositions whose truth is "no­
toriously indisputable among reasonable men."31 The judicial no­
tice section then refers the reader to Professor McCormick's 
hornbook on evidence32 for a detailed discussion of modem concepts 
of judicial notice; ranging from the need for and effect of judicial 
notice to trends in judicial notice of facts and law. 
The material on burden of proof refers the reader to Wigmore.33 
Professor Chadbourn of the Harvard Law School completed revision 
of Wigmore's burden of proof materials in 1981. These revised 
materials include discussion of the two facets of burden of proof: 
persuasion and production of evidence, and the tests associated with 
their establishment. 34 The materials also include discussion of the 
sufficiency of evidence in the context of directed verdicts and the 
various standards of proof, ranging from beyond a reasonable doubt 
to preponderance of evidence.35 The entire discussion in Wigmore is 
heavily footnoted, including citations to significant historical and 
leading cases and the Federal Rules of Evidence. In summary, Jus­
27. ld. at 17. 
28. ld. 
29. ld. at 37. 
30. ld. at 17 (citing Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269 (1944». 
31. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 274 (1944). 
32. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 328-335 (E. Cleary 
2d ed. 1972). 
33. P. LIACOS, supra note I, at 37 (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW §§ 2485-2489,2494-2495,2497-2498 (Chad rev. ed. 1981». 
34. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2485-2489 (Chad 
rev. ed. 1981). 
35. ld. §§ 2494-2495. 
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tice Liacos' numerous references to other sources makes the book an 
excellent starting point for those readers seeking extensive analysis. 
The book's sole shortcoming is its absence of a provision for 
updating. As Justice Liacos notes in his preface, statutory enact­
ments, adoption of new rules of court and ever-changing state and 
federal decisions continually modify evidentiary principles and es­
tablish new ones.36 "An effective advocate needs concise knowledge 
of the current doctrine. . ."37 associated with the various areas 
within the field of evidence. 
There are two potential methods for annual updating of the 
book. First, Justice Liacos could undertake the task himself and 
publish the result as an annual cumulative pocket part.38 Second, 
one of the law schools within the Commonwealth could undertake 
the task as an annual project in conjunction with its law review.39 In 
any event, implementation of an updating procedure would ensure 
the book's continuing value to members of the bench and practicing 
bar. 
In its present form and at this point in time, the book provides a 
concise description of current evidentiary doctrine within the com­
monwealth. The result is that any attorney who used and liked the 
fourth edition will find that Justice Liacos has continued that tradi­
tion of excellence in the fifth edition. This edition is worthy of its 
acclamation as "the Bible" of evidence in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. 
36. P. LIACOS, supra note I, at xxii. 
37. Id. at xxiii. 
38. Judge Weinstein's work on the Federal Rules of Evidence is a prime example 
of this type of annual update. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 
(1975 & rev. ed. 1982). 
39. Several law reviews within the commonwealth already undertake this type of 
annual survey and update. See, e.g., Annual Survey ofLabor Relations and Employment 
Discrimination Law, 21 B.C.L. REV. 85 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1980); Annual Survey ofRhode Island Lawfor the 1978-79 Term, 14 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 497 (1980); The United States Court ofAppealsfor the First Circuit, 1978-79 
Term, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 199 (1980). 
